Franz Brentano

The objects of sensory experience are deceptive. We have no right to believe that the objects of so-called external perception really exist as they appear to us. Indeed, they demonstrably do not exist outside of us. In contrast to that which really and truly exists, they are mere phenomena.

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Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity.

Brentano, Psychology

The essential theoretical foundations of logic lie in psychology, in whose field those propositions belong — as far as their theoretical content is concerned — which give logic its characteristic pattern.

Often people talk as if psychology provided the sole, sufficient, theoretical foundation for logical psychology.

Husserl, 2001

An unconscious consciousness is no more a contradiction in terms than an unseen case of seeing. Most laymen in psychology, however, will immediately reject the assumption of an unconscious consciousness, even without being influenced by false analogies associated with this expression.

Naturally philosophers were well familiar with the fact that we can possess a store of acquired knowledge without thinking about it. But they rightly conceived of this knowledge as a disposition toward certain acts of thinking, just as they conceived of acquired character as a disposition toward certain emotions and volitions, but not as cognition and consciousness. (Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint, p. 108, Mental Phenomena in general)

Franz Brentano